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This paper investigates the effects of business subsidies on the employment of firms in 
Finland, and explores possible regional differences in the effects. Employment of some 
26,000 firms is followed annually between 1995-1998. We find that the marginal effect 
of labour subsidies is about 34 per cent. As firms pay, on average, 60 per cent of the 
employment payroll of a worker in a subsidised job, our results suggest that labour 
subsidies displace the firms’ own employment expenditures. Moreover, the regional 
analysis indicates that the displacement effect has been milder in the countryside than 
elsewhere, contributing to the convergence of regional economies. This conclusion is 
not strong however, as in some other non-central areas displacement has been high. 
Finally, we find that Investment and Operation subsidies have stimulated employment 
only slightly in subsidised firms.  Interestingly, the observed positive effect is 
concentrated in just one group of regions, the effect being zero elsewhere in Finland. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, regional development in Finland has resulted in increasing regional 
divergence in the form of higher geographic concentration o f population, jobs, 
production and the standard of living, leaving large geographical areas lagging behind 
(Economic Council, 2001). The governments of the majority of industrialised countries 
use subsidies to support economic development in lagging regions. Traditionally, 
investment subsidies have constituted a major part of public subsidies, whereas labour 
subsidies have been distributed with less frequency. Despite their minor status, a more 
active role for labour subsidies has been advocated as well (Akerlof et al. 1991). For 
example, the high proportion of investment subsidies relative to labour subsidies has 
been criticised to be sub-optimal, since it contributes to the unemployment problem 
(Begg and Portes, 1993). During the last decade there has been a sharp increase in 
public subsidies for research and development activities of private firms (e.g. European 
Commission, 2000; Fuest and Huber, 2000; Irwin and Klennow, 1996; Payne, 1998). 
Most of these studies use recent quantitative evaluation methods (Blundel and Costa 
Dias, 2000; Heckman et al., 1999). Using these methods, Kangasharju and Venetoklis 
(2002) find for Finland that the marginal effect of labour subsidies with respect to 
employment of firms is 34 percent, i.e. one Euro more of subsidies increases the firm’s 
payroll by 34 cents. As on average, firms pay themselves 60 per cent of the employment 
costs of a worker in a subsidised job, these results suggest that labour subsidies displace 
the firms’ own employment expenditures. In addition, Kangasharju and Venetoklis 
(2002) report that public Investment and Operation subsidies increase employment only 
a little (indicating that a cost of creating jobs with this type of subsidy is high); and that 
public R&D subsidies have no effect on employment of firms in the short run of two 
years. 
The purpose of the present paper is to extend the work by Kangasharju and Venetoklis 
(2002) by evaluating whether public Labour subsidies or Investment and Operation 
subsidies have contributed to or worked against the regional concentration that has been 
prominent in Finland since the mid 1990s. If public subsidies have no effect on 
employment in lagging areas, then their use is waste of money. Instead, if they have a   3 
 
stronger effect on employment in lagging peripheral areas than in prospering central 
areas, then we should re-allocate these subsidies focusing on more to the former areas.  
Our empirical data spans from 1995 to 1998 and we concentrate on short-term impacts, 
studying effects during the first two years of a subsidised project. We analyse a large 
sample of firms, taken from the registers compiled by the Finnish Tax Authority. In an 
international context, this administrative data is unique and rare; it covers the whole 
population of firms that pay taxes in Finland, including information on their financial 
statement accounts and possible business subsidies. One common feature of the 
evaluation studies on business subsidies is that they concentrate on manufacturing firms 
for data availability reasons. Our data deviates from this in that it include firms from 
various industries (manufacturing, construction, transportation, wholesale and retail 
trade, business services, etc.)  
To preview the results, our regional analysis indicates that the displacement effect of 
Labour subsidies is weaker in the countryside than elsewhere, suggesting that labour 
subsidies have contributed to the convergence of regional economies in the country. 
This conclusion is not strong however, as in some other non-central areas displacement 
has been high. We also find that Investment and Operation subsidies have stimulated 
employment only slightly in subsidised firms. Interestingly, this positive effect is due to 
just one group of regions, the effect being zero elsewhere in Finland. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
subsidy scheme in Finland. Section 3 contains the method of evaluation. Section 4 
summarises the data at hand. Section 5 analyses and comments the measured impact of 
subsidies. Section 6 adds a regional dimension to the analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Subsidy schemes in Finland 
In this section we discuss briefly the business subsidy system in Finland. An attempt to 
give a comprehensive overview would be a lost cause considering the complexity of the 
system and our space constraints. We refer to the parties involved in distributing the 
subsidies, the types of subsidies, and the process followed.   4 
 
The notion of business subsidies has different interpretations and covers many different 
policy ’instruments’. For this paper we define business subsidies as direct transfers of 
money to private sector firms from a Ministry or a government Agency. These transfers 
are grants, in that the recipient firm is not obliged to pay the money received back to the 
distributor, as for example in the case of subsidised loans
1.  
In Finland business subsidies have been distributed to f irms since the late 1960s. 
Nowadays the biggest distributor in terms of absolute amounts is the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (KTM) through its regional units and one of its subsidiary Agencies, 
TEKES. Other important distributors is the Ministry of Labour (TM) and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. In our data set we examine direct subsidies distributed through the 
KTM, TEKES and the TM. 
Subsidies are mostly distributed through the so called TE-Centres (Regional 
Employment and Economic Development Centres). Within each centre there are units 
of the aforementioned ministries and depending on the type of project in question and 
other criteria, (i.e. the applicant’s geographical location) a firm submits its application 
for aid to its nearest TE-centre. 
Specifically in the case of subsidies through the TM, one could classify subsidies as 
moneys that are given to firms not only through its units in the TE-centres, but through 
the local Labour offices as well. There, firms can apply for this type of support. 
Individuals can also apply for a subsidy, if it is for a firm start-up (more on this below). 
There are different types of subsidies, meaning that they are given for different purposes 
(projects). This is also reflected in the distributor of subsidies (the Ministry or the 
Agency through which the funds flow). For example, the KTM specialises in fixed asset 
investments (machinery/equipment), naturally to firms in the manufacturing sector and 
TEKES concentrates its subsidies distribution to high-tech R & D projects. The purpose 
of labour subsidies is to improve human resources development of the work force as 
well as to encourage firms to increase employment. Labour subsidies are often directed 
                                                 
1 Under the general name of business subsidies however one could classify other ’subsidy instruments’ as 
well; for instance subsidised loans, guarantees to an export firm, investment tax credits (ITCs) etc. See for 
example how manufacturing subsidies to firms are classified within each EU country  in European 
Commission (2000, pp. 29-30).   5 
 
to firms who employ workers, whose productivity is lower than the level needed in 
active labour markets. Therefore these people are not easily employable with the 
prevailing minimum wage level of the sector in question. Labour subsidies are used to 
fill the gap between wages that firms are willing to pay to these people and the 
prevailing wage level. 
However, there is no clear distinction of the types of projects that can be financed by a 
specific distributor nor of the goals that this subsidy is designed to achieve. For 
instance, the KTM can finance a fixed asset investment in a manufacturing firm that 
could be classified as an R & D investment (TEKES); it could also be that one goal of 
this specific project is to increase the amount of permanent jobs within the firm (TM). 
Though a firm may receive subsidies from more than one source within one year, no 
firm can have more than one project subsidised at a time. 
Ever since Finland joined the EU in 1995 she automatically became eligible for 
Structural Funds and Community Initiative program financing. One of the major 
recipients of these funds are firms. EU funds can be distributed vertically (i.e. to firms 
located in specific geographical areas, to firms with special characteristics -such as 
SMEs- etc.) or horizontally meaning that all firms are eligible as long as they fulfil 
some other basic criteria (i.e. the type of project in question). 
The Finnish legislation related to subsidies is rather vague as to defining which firms 
should be eligible, but basically it stipulates that the potential recipients should be 
profitable or should have the prerequisites to become so. 
There are special programs for start-up firms which can be financed with start-up capital 
and/or salary compensations. 
For the type of subsidies we examine, the government distributors finance only part of 
the total project cost; the firm must find the rest of the costs from its own reserves, 
tapping the private credit markets or even finding yet another government grant 
distributor.  
The amount of subsidies distributed per project, as proportion of the total cost, depends 
on the type of project, the type of firm, the geographical area where the firm is located,   6 
 
the source of subsidy (national, EU), etc. The average coverage of KTM subsidies is 
approximately 20%, but it can reach up to 60% of the total cost. For subsidies through 
TEKES the coverage depends on the type of high-tech development project. It ranges 
between 25% for product development costs, to 50% for costs relating to strategic 
planning, marketing, business partnership developments, etc. If the applicant is an SME 
the cost coverage increases by 10 percentage points. 
The labour related subsidies arranged directly through the local Labour offices are based 
on an amount up to approx. € 840 per month for up to 10 months (in 2001). On average 
however, the length of subsidised period is 6 months.  
The level of worker’s human capital in the subsidised job determines the exact amount 
of subsidy. The longer the worker has been unemployed prior the subsidy, the higher the 
subsidy. Similarly, a lower level of education increases the subsidy. Although in 
principal the applicant individual can negotiate with the firm on an extra salary amount 
that the firm could pay him from its own funds, in general workers in subsidised jobs 
are paid according to the prevalent wage rate. As t he typical subsidised jobs are 
cleaners, clerks, secretaries, office workers, unskilled manufacturing workers and 
salesmen, we have estimated that, on average, firms pay themselves 60 per cent of the 
employment payroll of a worker in a subsidised job, i.e. for each Euro received as 
subsidy, the firm must put on average 1.5 Euros of its own money when creating a 
subsidised job (1.5/(1+1.5)=0.60).
2 This estimation is based on those workers’ 
corresponding centralised union wage agreement. Apart from their subsidised status, 
these jobs in private firms have exactly the same specifications as the non-subsidised 
ones. 
In the majority of cases, the firm that has been awarded certain amount of subsidies has 
first to make the disbursement of funds from its own resources. Then it has to submit 
the relevant invoices to the respective (local) distributing organisation and (only then) 
gets the agreed subsidy compensation. In cases where the matter calls for start-up 
capital or when the distributor part-subsidises labour related activities (salaries), the 
                                                 
2 According to the Ministry of Labour, average subsidy is € 620 a month and average wage in a 
subsidised job is € 1560.   7 
 
disbursement occurs as soon as the need arises. In other words, in terms of KTM and 
TEKES the subsidy is given at the middle and/or at the end of the project’s investment 
period, whereas in terms of TM, the subsidy is given already from the start. 
3. Framework of empirical analysis 
As we mentioned in the previous section, firm subsidies in Finland are delivered on the 
basis of project specific applications. When a firm receives a subsidy, it has to 
contribute from its own resources. When receiving labour subsidies, firms must be able 
to demonstrate that individual(s) have been employed with the assistance of these 
subsidies (there is no direct employment responsibility in the two other types of 
subsidies
3). Therefore, labour subsidies affect directly payroll, the number of personnel 
and the value-added of firms, as the subsidies are included in the total payroll firms pay 
during a f inancial year. This results in problems with the choice of an endogenous 
variable for the regression analysis, as the subsidies appear in both sides of the equation. 
However, we can overcome this, by subtracting from the firm’s employment payroll the 
amount of subsidies received.
4 We call this variable the firm’s own (or private) payroll 
and run alternative regressions, where three proxies for employment are the alternative 
endogenous variables. These proxies are the number of personnel, payroll and own 
payroll. 
We estimate the effect of business subsidies in the following fashion. Let D=1 denote 
the event of receiving a subsidy and D=0 denote the event of not receiving a subsidy. 
Let y represent the log of firm’s own employment (subsidised employment are 
subtracted from the firm’s total employment). Let y0 and y1 be the log of firm’s own 
employment level when the project is not subsidised (D=0) and when it is subsidised 
(D=1), respectively. The ‘benefit’ in the firm’s own employment from receiving the 
subsidy is Dyt= y1t - y0t, where Dyt is the effect of subsidy that we would like to find 
out. In this context, positive Dyt stimulates the firm’s own employment, because extra 
                                                 
3 The employment responsibility is indirect in the sense that the subsidies are given to Investment and 
R&D projects that most probably yield positive effects on employment. 
4 Sales would be another alternative, since subsidies do not directly affect the amount of goods and 
services a firm can sell (worker hired with the subsidy money does not necessarily help the firm to sell 
extra units of its product). On the other hand however, subsidies may distort sales figures, if they affect 
relative prices of production factors.   8 
 
employment that would have not been created without the subsidy, is indeed presently 
created. Note that the difference Dy can still be positive, even when the subsidy is 
superfluous and the released funds
5 are used to other employment expenses that could 
not have occurred before the subsidy funds became available.  
Using the data at hand as a point of reference, this means that to be positively effective, 
R&D or Investment and Operation subsidies must stimulate the firms’ employment in a 
statistically significant way. As discussed above, Labour subsidies are different 
however. The firm must cover 60 per cent of the employment costs of the subsidised 
job. Therefore, Labour subsidies are positively effective only if one Euro of subsidies 
stimulates firms’ own (private) employment expenditures by more than 1.5 Euros 
(1+1.5=2.5 and 1.5/2.5=0.60). 
If the subsidy effect is zero, the subsidy does not, on average, stimulate or displace the 
firm’s own employment (payroll) expenditure. The firm adjusts its employment 
expenditures to accommodate the subsidised project, which the firm is committed to 
invest upon, when getting the subsidy
6. In this case, subsidised and non-subsidised 
employment on average cancels out. Finally, a negative effect means that the subsidy 
displaces the firm’s own employment expenditures, either because (i) not all of the 
released resources from subsidising a superfluous project are directed to other 
employment expenditures
7, or (ii) the subsidised project simply crowds out other non-
subsidised employment.  
Our method of analysis is a generalised version of the widely used difference-in-
differences (DID) method in that our setting follows one set of firms that do not receive 
any subsidies in period t-1, but some of them start receiving subsidies in period t.
8 This 
method has also an advantage over the cross-sectional analysis, as it has observations 
for subsidised firms before as well as during the period of subsidy. We measure the 
                                                 
5 The ones replaced by the subsidies. 
6 However, in the Finnish case at least, there is no legal obligation to invest in the project successfully. 
That is, the firm does not have to return the subsidies if the project does not fulfil the whatever predefined 
goals are stated in the initial application and in the file attached to the decision when granting the 
subsidies. 
7 But to other activities such as marketing, etc.   9 
 
effect of subsidies estimating the change in employment in subsidised firms compared 
to those that continue not receiving subsidies. This is carried out by a fixed effects 
estimation of the panel data.  
The main econometric problem is that the effect of subsidy cannot be computed for any 
individual firm precisely, because data on the counterfactual are missing (Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 2000; Heckman et al. 1999).
9 We do not know what the ‘y0’ would have 
been for firms that received subsidies. Thus, Dyt has to be estimated. We estimate an 
average gain for the firms that received a subsidy in terms of payroll and personnel 
growth. This is called the effect of treatment on the treated.  
We assume that conditional on the firm not having a subsidy at time t-1, receiving a 
subsidy at t shifts expected employment by b. Then, 
E(y1t | Dt=1, Dt-1=0) = E(y0t | Dt=1, Dt-1=0) + b      (1) 
and 
b = E(y1t-y0t | Dt=1, Dt-1=0) = E(Dt | Dt=1, Dt-1=0).      (2) 
If the treatment and control group were randomly selected, the control group would 
provide a proper counterfactual. In this case an estimator b would be the simple 
difference in the mean employment by support status (status getting or not subsidies) in 
period t, conditional on not having received a subsidy at t-1. In other words, we would 
get an unbiased estimator, as there are no common or correlated factors determining 
both the probability of receiving a subsidy and the employment. In this case 
E(y0it | Dit=1, Dit-1=0) = E(y0it | Dit=0, Dit-1=0)      (3). 
However, in our case as in most public policy interventions, the target group (the firms) 
are not randomly selected to receive subsidies. First, the firms themselves come forward 
and apply for subsidies. Second, in order to be considered for financing they have to 
                                                                                                                                               
8 In standard differences-in-differences method one analyses two cross-sections, one before and one after 
the treatment. 
9 It is not possible to have the same firms classified as having received and not having received subsidies 
during a certain time period.   10 
 
fulfil certain general and basic criteria imposed by the program under which the 
subsidies are distributed (i.e. based on their geographical location, their size, their 
general profitability, the type of project in question, the type of subsidy, etc). Third, 
there is evidence to argue that the subsidy distributing Ministries and Agencies tend to 
‘pick the winners’ by giving subsidies more often to more profitable and promising 
firms compared to the general population. (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998; Klette, et 
al., 1999; Lipsky, 1980; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2001; Venetoklis, 2001). Finally, 
the probability of receiving a subsidy and the growth rates of employment certainly 
differ among industries. In all of these cases, E(y0t | Dt=1, Dt-1=0) in equation (1) is not 
identified, i.e. y0t is not mean independent of D. 
We try to achieve this mean independence by conditioning expected mean employment 
both in subsidised and non-subsidised groups of firms based on their observable and 
unobservable characteristics. When conditioning on observables, we regress 
employment on subsidy-status and additional regressors that are correlated with 
subsidy-status and employment.
10  
If there is no selection on unobservables, the following condition holds. 
E(y0it | Xit, Dit=1, Dit-1=0) = E(y0it | Xit, Dit=0, Dit-1=0),    (4) 
where X is a vector of covariates. Equation (4) says that conditional on X, the selection 
into the subsidy program is not based on variables correlated with y0it.  
Let us consider the observables. As mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that 
policymakers are willing to subsidise firms that have the best prospects. This helps aid-
distributors to allege that subsidies are effective. An indicator of high growth potential 
we use, is the profitability of firms. Apart from promising prospects, profitability eases 
liquidity constraints and creates room for future expansions, thus correlating with both 
subsidy-status and employment growth. The form of the variable is the gross 
profit/loss.
11 We could use this variable also as lagged by one year, when the subsidy 
agencies are choosing fundable projects. The lagged and current period variables are 
                                                 
10 Later in the paper we replace subsidy-status dummy with the log amount of subsidies.   11 
 
highly correlated however (correlation being 0.82) and the use of a lag would drop one 
estimable period
12 (Table A2 in Appendix). Due to the resulting multicollinearity, the 
dramatically lower number of observations and the very minor changes in results, we 
report below only the results obtained excluding the lagged profitability (results with 
lagged profitability are available upon request).  
In order to further control for the selection, we also add the amount of sales, the average 
wage and fixed capital as log-form to the regression. These variables control differences 
between firms in output, wages and investments, all of which contribute to employment. 
Sales are also used in the literature as a proxy for future profitability (Klette and Moen, 
1997; Lach, 2000). Wage controls for inflation, making the use of nominal, rather than 
real figures, sufficient.
13 Sales and fixed capital also control for the size of firms. 
It is important to  control for the size of firms. One consequence of the ‘pick-the-
winners’ phenomenon is that subsidies are given more often to larger than to smaller 
firms, since most of the smallest firms are very young and thus less reliable survivors 
(Venetoklis, 2001). Moreover, it is a well-known fact that larger firms tend to have 
smaller relative growth rates than the smaller firms (Evans, 1987; Dunne and Hugher, 
1994; Dunne et al. 1988). Therefore, the omission of a size variable would bias the 
estimates for the coefficient of the subsidy variable downwards, as subsidies are given 
more often to larger firms that have lower growth rates than smaller firms.  
As far as other observable variables are concerned, it is argued that the regional impact 
of sectors is important. One key industry might be more important for a region than 
some other. Since regional officers of the subsidy agencies largely decide which firms  
are given subsidies, they may subsidise firms in one industry more often than its 
counterparts in another. On the other hand, there are clear differences in growth rates 
                                                                                                                                               
11 We do not take logarithm of this variable, as a fraction of the firms make gross losses every year (losses 
are negative, thus cannot be logged). 
12 Initially we have four estimable years and over 26,000 cross-sectional observations. One period (i.e. 
about 26,000 observations) is lost when we include lagged subsidy and control variables in  the model. If 
we added a second lag of profitability, the number of estimable years would drop to two. 
13 Converting nominal prices into real ones would be particularly problematic in equations where the 
effect of different amounts of subsidies is estimated. Payroll figures could be deflated by producer price 
indices, whereas they cannot be used in deflating the subsidy, as subsidies are given to  firms operating in 
different industries.   12 
 
between industries. Hence, a joint ‘effect’ is that the industrial classification must be 
controlled.  
In addition to the observables, we also take into account the effect of unobservable 
characteristics. Some of these are firm-specific but time-invariant. Others are common 
to all firms in one year but vary over time. We use time dummies to capture effects that 
are common to all the firms but vary over time. In terms of firm-specific effects, there 
might be regional differences in economic environment or industrial policies, or the 
legal form of firms could matter. Further, apart from the regional importance of 
industries, regional offices and officers may have different standards for applicant firms 
also for other reasons. Some offices or officers may grant money to firms more easily 
than others, partially due to the fact that in some regions there may simply be more 
applicant firms (Venetoklis, 1999). We remove all these time-invariant factors (some of 
which are firm-specific and the others industry- or region-specific) by estimating firm-
specific fixed-effect models. 
Moreover, the use of fixed effects also alleviates the problem of self-selection, which 
arises from the fact that we cannot observe all firm-specific factors that determine the 
probability of receiving subsidies and employment.  
Thus, using all these controls and methods of analysis, we estimate the following 
equation: 
Eit = a + bDit + c Xit + vt + hi + eit        (5) 
 
where, E can be (i) employment (number of personnel), (ii) total payroll (total = private 
+ subsidy) or (iii) the firm’s own (private) payroll; X is a vector of control variables 
(correlates with both E and D); v is a vector of time dummies, and h shows fixed effects 
(at the industry or individual level in our models below). D equals a dummy f or 
subsidised firms. We also estimate models where the log amount of subsidies is 
substituted for subsidy dummy. Coefficients b and c measure the structural, selection-
corrected, effect of the observables on E, whereas h is the ‘selection effect’ (omitted 
variable bias) relating employment and the observables. All variables used in   13 
 
estimations are described in Table 1. Table A1 in Appendix gives descriptive statistics 
for these variables and Table A2 shows the correlations between the variables. 
Table 1.   Description of variables 
Variable  Form of variable 
Endogenous (alternatives to each other) 
The number of personnel  Ln (the number of personnel) 
Payroll  Ln(the amount of payroll) 
Own payroll  Ln(the amount of own payroll) 
Variable of interest (alternatives to each other) 
Dummy for subsidised firms  1= when subsidised, 0 otherwise 
Amount of subsidy  Ln(1 + the amount of subsidies) 
   
Control variables   
Profitability  Gross profits/Losses 
Sales  Ln(the amount of sales) 
Fixed capital  Ln(the amount of fixed capital) 
Average wage   Ln(payroll per personnel) 
Sector effects  20 sector dummies 
Year effects  Year dummies (1995-6-7-8) 
Individual effects  Individual dummies per firm 
Note: Ln is natural logarithm. Ln(1 + the amount of subsidies) is Ln(1) for non- subsidised firms. 
 
4. Description of data set  
Our sample has been taken from the registers compiled by the Finnish Tax Authority. 
These registers cover the whole population of firms that pay taxes in Finland, including 
information on their industrial sector, size, financial statement accounts and possible 
business subsidy receipts.  
In the data analysed we keep only those firms that employ at least one fulltime person 
each year. We drop from the sample those firm if their log size of sales has changed 
more than +/-2.5 times over a year (this eliminates the effects of take-overs and 
mergers). We also drop firms that have non-plausibly low or high average wage 
(payroll/the number of personnel). Finally, after these restrictions, the variables in the 
remaining sample have missing values in some rows. Therefore, the number of 
observations varies from model specification to another. 
The data set under analysis spans from 1995 to 1998 and the total of 103,082 
observations refer here to firm-year pairs (Table 2). There are a little more than 26,000   14 
 
firms in the data, which is more than one quarter of all the observations as the panel is 
unbalanced. The data includes over 18,000 subsidy records that correspond to 18 per 
cent of all observations. Most of the subsidies in our sample are given for employment 
purposes (14,241), whereas R&D subsides is the smallest group of the three. In contrast, 
the average size of R&D subsidies is as high as € 105,826, whereas that of an 
employment subsidy is only € 4,240. Also note  that the sum of Investments and 
Operation subsidies is the largest (€ 200 million). 
Table 2.   Summary statistics for subsidies, 1995-1998 
Subsidy type  Observations 
on subsidies 




Sum of subsidies, 
€ million 
Employment 
(through the TM) 
  14,241    0.138    4,240    60 
Investment and 
operation (KTM) 
  5,725    0.056    34,834    200 
R & D (TEKES)    1,307    0.013   105,826    138 




  84,644    0.821     
All observations 
(firm-year pairs) 
  103,082    1.000     
Note: One firm may have received subsidies from more than one source in one year. 
In Table 3, we list various types of subsidies spent during the period 1995-1999 
controlling for the distributor. We also include the proportion of a specific sub-type of 
subsidy compared to the overall amount of subsidies distributed per source. This gives 
an idea into which types of projects emphasis is placed per distributing organisation.  
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Table 3.   Business subsidies distributed through the KTM, TM and TEKES during 
1995-1999 
Source and Type  %  % 
KTM (Investment and Operation subsidies)     
Investments     
  Regional investments    47   
  Small enterprises (mainly for investments)    15   
  Energy related investments    3    65 
Operation subsidies     
  Research and product development     16   
  Small business development operations    7   
  Internationalisation     8   
  Environmental purposes    4    35 
All    100    100 
TM (labour subsidies)     
General labour subsidies and structural aid     
  Investment with employment goal    2   
  Training and work     6   
  EU and Structural aid    21    30 
Other labour-related subsidies     
  Other labour related aid    15   
  Other aid through TM    41    56 
Aid to entrepreneurs     
  Direct labour aid to entrepreneurs    5   
  Direct training and work aid to entrepreneurs    8   
  Combined subsidy to private sector entrepreneurs    1    14 
All    100    100 
TEKES (R & D subsidies)     
  Product development subsidies      59 
  Subsidies for applied research      41 
All      100 
Note: Figures are provided by the Finnish Tax Authority (Verohallitus) database which are in turn 
compiled  from data given to them by the Ministries/Agency in question. 
Be aware that this breakdown is at a very general level and it might not correspond to 
the exact division per subsidy type currently applied. We have compiled the table based 
on the data set at hand. In practice, the individual types of subsidies classified on a per-
project-goal basis can be much more detailed. Finally note that due to data 
unavailability, the descriptive and econometric analysis that follows does not break 
down the amount of subsidies per sub-type, but just per source per year; that is we 
aggregate all the subsidies received by a firm from a specific source (TM, KTM , 
TEKES) during each year of the period 1995-1998. We call these subsidies as follows: 
Labour (TM), Investment and Operation (KTM), and R&D (TEKES) subsidies.   16 
 
Overall, these subsidies are small relative to the number of employees within the 
assisted firms. On average € 1,226 of subsidies are given per employee, or about 6 per 
cent of the firm’s own payroll expenditures (Table 4). Here we also see that the average 
size of labour subsidies is smaller than that of other types of subsidies. 
Table 4.   Subsidies relative to employment among subsidised firms 




Relative to own 
payroll 
Labour (TM)    498    0.027    0.032 
Investment and operation (KTM)    1,703    0.072    0.076 
R & D (TEKES)    4,409    0.146    0.151 
All subsidies    1,226    0.053    0.059 
Note: As some firms receive subsidies from more than one source in a year, the proportion of KTM and 
TEKES subsidies relative to payroll and own payroll differ from each other. 
As found elsewhere, the size distribution of firms (measured in terms of number of 
employees) is highly skewed to the right (Column 1 in Table 5). Almost three-quarters 
of firms employ 10 people or less; and the proportion of large firms, employing more 
than 250  people, is just one per cent. The number of subsidies has a more even 
distribution than the size of firms (columns 2 and 3). The proportion of subsidies for 
firms employing less than 10 people is smaller than their share of firms, whereas the 
opposite applies to firms employing at least 10 people. Also, the amount of subsidies 
increases linearly with the size of the firms (column 4). The average amount of 
subsidies is approx. € 6,100 among the smallest firms, whereas it is as high as € 165,000 
among the largest ones. In contrast, the average size of subsidy per employee decreases 
with the increasing size of firms (column 5).  
One novelty in this data set is that it includes firms outside the manufacturing sector. 
The proportion of manufacturing firms in our data is approx. 18 per cent of all the 
subsidised firms and its respective proportion of subsidy amounts is 36 per cent (Table 
6). The other industrial sectors absorb a smaller proportion of subsidies relative to their 
number of firms, with the business service sector receiving the least amount of subsidies 
per firm.   17 
 
Table 5.  Firm size and subsidies 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 














1  0.153  0.034  0.2  6,096  6,057 
2-10  0.565  0.420  0.7  7,392  1,597 
10-50  0.227  0.382  1.7  16,145  727 
50-250  0.045  0.128  2.8  47,971  488 
More than 250  0.010  0.036  3.7  164,936  293 
All  1.000  1.000  1.0  12,559  2,021 
 
Finally, we take a look at firms that did not receive any subsidies in the year t-1 and 
compare employment (number of employees) in subsidised and non-subsidised firms in 
year t (Table 7). It appears that firms who start receiving subsidies in period t have 
clearly more employees than those that continue to be non-subsidised in the same period 
(t). The mean employment of firms that have not received any subsidies in period t-1 or 
t is 10 in both periods, whereas the respective figure for subsidised firms with labour 
subsidies is grows from 20 in t-1 to 29 in t. Employment in firms that start receiving 
Investment and Operation subsidies increases from 26 to 31, whereas that of firms that 
get R&D subsidies in year t is rockets from 55 to 132. The average difference between 
subsidised and non-subsidised firms is even higher, when we use their payroll as a 
comparison criterion.   18 
 
Table 6.  Industrial structure in the data set 
Industry  (1)        
Proportion 
of firms 




Manufacturing  0.181  0.355  2.0 
Other industrial production  0.138  0.123  0.9 
Whole sale and retail trade  0.300  0.249  0.8 
Business services  0.196  0.124  0.6 
Other private services  0.186  0.148  0.8 
All  1.000  1.000   
 
Table 7.   The mean employment of subsidised and non-subsidised firms in the year 
t; no subsidies in t-1 
  Subsidies in year t 
 
No subsidies 






Personnel (t-1), number                10                20                26                55 
Personnel (t), number    10    29    31    132 
Payroll, €    251,793    812,185    819,874   4,574,735 
Own Payroll, €    251,793    808,769    819,874   4,574,735 
Note: Payroll and Own Payroll figures are the same for firms that start receiving Investment and 
Operation subsidies and R&D subsidies, since there is no obligation to employ anyone with these 
subsidies. Therefore these subsidies do not directly affect payroll. 
Based on the aforementioned results, can we conclude that subsidies have a positive and 
substantial impact on the employment of firms? Unfortunately no, because these results 
fail to take into account two things. First, labour subsidies trivially affect employment 
and payroll, causing a spurious correlation between labour subsidies and employment 
(this applies only to subsidised jobs (TM), not to the subsidies from two other sources 
(KTM, TEKES)). As mentioned earlier, firms receiving labour subsidies have to employ   19 
 
someone with the money they get from the public source. Second, there is a possibility 
that subsidies are given more often to more promising firms that would grow faster than 
others, even without subsidies.  
We can alleviate the first problem the using the firms’ own payroll as the endogenous 
variable. We subtract possible public labour subsidies from the firm’s total payroll and 
compute a new variable that is called the firm’s own (private) payroll. We find that, 
even in this variable, employment is vastly higher in subsidised firms compared to non-
subsidised ones (Table 7). 
The second problem refers to omitted variables and calls for regression analysis, an 
investigation which follows next. 
5. Results 
5.1 Average effect of subsidies 
We continue the analysis of firms, all of which do not receive any subsidies in the year 
t-2 but some of which receive in year t -1 and t.  We regress three alternative 
employment variables on dummies for both the current subsidies and subsidies received 
in t-1, and current and lagged control variables described in Table 1.
14 Using firms that 
do not receive subsidies in t-2, we explore whether subsidies have time effects in the 
sense that they would be more beneficial over a longer period than one year. 
In the following we report coefficients and heteroscedasticity corrected t-values. In the 
personnel and payroll equations, the lagged effect of subsidy is as strong as the current 
one (column 1 in Table 8). The effect of current subsidies on log-employment and 
payroll is 0.061, whereas the effect of lagged subsidies is 0.065, the sum equalling 
0.126. In the own-payroll equation the lagged effect is clearly stronger than the current 
one. The current effect on log-payroll is 0.038, whereas that of lagged subsidies is 
0.066. This implies that subsidies start bearing more fruits in a longer term than one 
year. The sum of the coefficients is 0.104, which equals to 11.0 per cent (e
0.104-
                                                 
14 Below we also estimate models where we replace subsidy dummies by log of subsidies.   20 
 
1=0.1096).
15 Although the sum of coefficients is smaller in the own-payroll equation 
than in the personnel one, the difference is very small in magnitude. 
Table 8.   Effect of Labour (TM) subsidies with a lag; Individual fixed effects; 
endogenous variable is ln(Eit), i=1-3; N=42,883 
Ln(Eit)  Dt  Dt-1  Sum  R
2 
Personnel  0.061 (7.0)  0.065 (6.5)  0.126  ***  0.65 
Payroll  0.061 (8.1)  0.065 (7.5)  0.126  ***  0.27 
Own payroll  0.038 (5.1)  0.066 (7.6)  0.104  ***  0.27 
Note: E i, i=1-3 where 1= personnel, 2= payroll and 3= own payroll. We compute the 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance to remove heteroscedasticity. These adjusted t-values are 
given in parentheses. D is a dummy for labour subsidies. Control variables include the profits (gross 
profit), sales, average wage and fixed capital in the current and lagged form. We also have controls for 
firms that have received other types of subsidies. *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent level, 
** denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10 per 
cent level. 
We also checked the effects of the Investment and Operation subsidies. Here we do not 
necessarily have to estimate the own-payroll equation, as these subsidies include no 
obligation to employ anyone with the subsidy received. Nevertheless, results remain 
very similar across the three alternative endogenous variables. When investigating the 
personnel equation, it turns out that the joint effect of the lagged and current period 
subsidies is zero when evaluated at the conventional levels of significance (Table 9). 
Statistical significance is not reached even when we allow investments to take place (i.e. 
we exclude fixed capital from the equation). Note however that the joint effect of 
Investment and Operation subsidies is significant at the 10 per cent level. The marginal 
significance is due to the fact that, the lagged effect is positive. This implies that 
subsidised investments start bearing fruit in a longer term. The first year would not be 
long enough a period to evaluate its significance.  
                                                 
15 We also experimented including the profit variable lagged by two periods (i.e. lagged one period with 
respect to the one-period lagged subsidy dummy). In this setting, firms were applying for subsidies in t-2. 
Therefore their suitability for subsidies is being evaluated at that period. In these models the high 
correlation between three variables of profitability became a problem (correlations being between 0.82 
and 0.95). Further, another lag of profitability decreased the estimable years to two, and that dramatically 
decreased the number of observations. Regardless of these problems, the results remained remarkably 
similar to those reported in Table 8. These results are not shown here.   21 
 
Table 9.   Effect of business subsidies on the number of personnel; Individual fixed effects; 
endogenous variable is ln(personnel) 
  Including fixed capital as control  Excluding fixed capital as control 
  Coefficient 

















Dt  0.061 (7.0)  0.001 (0.1)  -0.054 (-0.9)  0.066 (7.7)  0.004 (0.2)  -0.056 (-0.9) 
Dt-1  0.065 (6.5)  0.044 (2.6)  0.001 ( 0.0)  0.073 (7.5)  0.049 (2.8)  -0.000 (-0.0) 
Sum  0.126   ***  0.045 (     )  -0.053 (     )  0.139  ***  0.053 (   *)  -0.056 (     ) 
N (R
2-within)  42,882 (0.65)  44,925 (0.63) 
Note: D is a dummy for subsidies. Apart from fixed capital, control variables include the profits (gross 
profit), sales and average wage in the current and lagged form. We compute the Huber/White/Sandwich 
estimator of variance to remove heteroscedasticity. These adjusted t-values are given in parentheses. In 
the tests for the statistical significance of the sum of coefficients *** denote statistical significance at the 
1 per cent level, ** denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent level, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 10 per cent level. 
5.2 Marginal effects 
In this section we augment the analysis by exploring the effect of  sized business 
subsidies. We estimate the marginal effects of subsidies using log-log models, i.e. we 
include natural logarithm of subsidies in the regressions (Table 10). Results indicate that 
the elasticity of the firm’s own payroll with respect to labour subsidies is 0.0108. As the 
average proportion of subsidies relative to own payroll is 0.032 (see Table 4), the 
marginal effect of subsidies is 0.34 (0.0108/0.0322), i.e. one Euro of extra subsidies 
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Table 10.  Elasticity of own payroll with respect to labour subsidies;  
Endogenous variable is ln (own payroll) 
Variable  Coefficient  Significance  N  R
2-within 
Ln(subsidy)t  0.0038  4.8     
Ln(subsidy)t-1  0.0070  7.7     
Sum  0.0108  (***)  42,864  0.27 
Results by industry  Sum of   
coefficients 
Significance  N  R
2-within 
Manufacturing  0.0106  (***)  13,047  0.34 
Whole sale and 
retail trade 
0.0091  (**)  13,757  0.22 
Other private 
services 
0.0124  (***)  16,074  0.28 
Note: We compute the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance to remove heteroscedasticity. These 
adjusted t-values are given in parentheses. In the tests for the statistical significance of the sum of 
coefficients (***) denotes statistical significance  at the 1 % level, (**) denotes statistical significance at 
the 5 % level and (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level. Control variables include 
profitability, sales and fixed capital in the current and lagged form, and subsidies from two other sources. 
The magnitude of the effect is modest. To create one extra job (lasting one year), the 
amount of labour subsidies needed is € 15,400 per year (the average payroll per 
employee is € 20,700 per year; see Table A1 in Appendix), the rate of subsidy relative 
to the cost of one job being 0.75. The effect is actually too modest to be positively 
effective. Since on average the firm cover 60 per cent of the costs of a subsidised job, 
this suggests that labour subsidies have displaced firms own employment payroll, 
allowing firms to allocate their employment expenditures to other uses. This result 
derives from the following fact. If a firm’s share is 60 %, then the public share is 40%.
16 
We also check whether there is any difference in the elasticity of labour subsidies across 
the industrial sector of firms. It turns out that the elasticity is rather similar over the 
                                                 
16 When the public subsidies are increased by one Euro, the firm must increase payroll at least by 1.5 in 
order to have a positive effect (1 / 0.40 = 2.5 and 1.5 / 2.5 = 0.60).   23 
 
sectors (Table 10). In business services the elasticity is 0.0124 and in manufacturing it is 
0.0106 per cent. In Wholesale and Retail Trade the elasticity is somewhat smaller, 
0.0091. The effect has not caused capital to be substituted by labour, as we control for 
fixed capital. 
In Table 11 we report the coefficients and heteroscedasticity-corrected t-values for all 
variables in an own-payroll equation. The elasticity of KTM subsidies with respect to 
the own payroll (sum of the two coefficients) is 0.0036 (column (2) in Table 11).
17 The 
KTM subsidies are not statistically significant when the joint significance of current and 
lagged variables is evaluated.
18 As found earlier however, the lagged KTM subsidies are 
again individually statistically significant. When evaluating the economic significance, 
we compute the marginal effect, which is as low as 0.047 (0.0036/0.076).
19 This implies 
that one Euro increase in Investment and Operation subsidies increase payroll in firms 
on average by the minuscule amount of 5 cents. This indicates that despite of their 
statistical significance and objectives to increase employment, Investment and 
Operation subsidies are expensive from an employment point of view. As the average 
wage is € 21 000, one extra job created with Investment and Operation subsidies costs € 
440 000 (20668/0.047=439738). In personnel equations we end up with very similar 
marginal effect.
20 The elasticity of personnel with respect to KTM subsidies appears to 
be 0.042 and the marginal effect 4.2*10
-7 (see Table 4).
21 According to these estimates 
the cost of one job is € 430 000, which may sound very high. One has to bear in mind 
however, that a large part of these subsidies are given as investment subsidies. Although 
this result suggests that the subsidised investments have not resulted in any considerable 
number of new jobs, investments may nevertheless have other positive effects on firms. 
                                                 
17 Note that here we have removed the firms from the data that are located in 4-digit industries where 
Investment and Operation subsidies were not delivered.  
18 The same applies to an otherwise similar model where we use the number of personnel as our 
endogenous variable. - Results are not shown but are available upon request. 
19 Recall that 0.076 is the average proportion of KTM subsidies to the payroll, as shown in Table 4. 
20 Not shown in Table 11 but are available upon request. 
21 0.042/€1703=0.00000042   24 
 
Table 11.   Effects of business subsidies on the own payroll; log-log model;  
  (1)    (2)   
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Ln(subsidy)t, TM  0.0038   4.0  0.0043  4.3 
Ln(subsidy)t-1, TM  0.0070  6.5  0.0078  6.9 
Ln(subsidy)t, KTM  -0.0002  -0.2    0.0000  0.0 
Ln(subsidy)t-1, KTM  0.0034   1.9     0.0035  2.0 
Ln(subsidy)t, TEKES  -0.0044   -0.8    -0.0059  -1.1 
Ln(subsidy)t-1, TEKES  -0.0000   -0.0     -0.0018  -0.4 
Gross profit t  0.0012   2.7     0.0015  3.1 
Gross profit t-1  -0.0001   -0.2    -0.0006  -0.9 
Year 1997  0.0427  13.9    0.0405  11.9 
Year 1998  0.0701  9.5  0.0672  7.5 
Ln(sales)t  0.1804   9.6     0.2058   9.8 
Ln(sales)t-1  0.0771   5.9    0.0899  5.7 
Ln(fixed capital)t  0.0412  7.7     
Ln(fixed capital)t-1  0.0261   5.7        
Average wage t  0.2036  18.0  0.2118  16.7 
Average wage t-1  -0.0878  -8.5    -0.0964  -8.2 
Constant  7.507  18.4     7.8043  16.2 
N; R
2-within  42,865; 0.65  37,127; 0.27 
Note: Model (2) excludes fixed capital controls and firms from the data that are in 4-digit sectors where 
KTM-subsidies were not delivered in 1995-1998. We compute the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of 
variance to remove heteroscedasticity. These adjusted t-values are given in their own column. 
Finally, again in Table 11 it appears that demand, approximated by the sales of firms, is 
positively associated with employment. Similarly fixed capital has a positive 
coefficient. These results accord with respective findings in literature (Hamersmesh,   25 
 
1993). In contrast, the current wage coefficient has a perverse positive sign. This result 
is accounted for by the construct of the wage variable. Since it is the log of payroll per 
the number of personnel, the same (payroll) variable appears in both sides of the 
equation, causing the positive sign of the variable. The lagged average wage, on the 
other hand, has a negative sign. 
6. Regional analysis 
In this section we conduct a regional analysis of our data. We divide the regions of 
Finland into five different functional groups and cross tabulate them with six industrial 
sectors. Using Regional Accounts compiled by Statistics Finland, we find that the 
capital region, Helsinki, is characterised by a higher per capita GDP and a higher 
proportion of jobs in private services compared to the respective figures of the other 
groups (Table 12). In the ‘other large university regions’ and the ‘other provincial 
centres’, the proportion of public sector is somewhat higher than elsewhere. The 
’manufacturing regions’ are c haracterised by relatively high per capita GDP and 
(naturally) by the high presence of manufacturing jobs. In the ‘countryside’, the 
proportion of agricultural jobs is of course high, whereas the per capita GDP is, as 
expected, the lowest. We list all sub-regions within these six groups in Table A3 in the 
Appendix. 
Table 12.  Summary statistics for regional groups, 1999 












Population  1,163,841    876,010    1,178,559    735,743  1,211,343 
GDP/capita, €    30,800    21,121    18,123    20,000    14,050 
Industrial structure, %       
Agriculture  0.4  1.3  4.5  5.6  14.4 
Manufacturing  13.2  22.1  21.4  30.9  21.6 
Construction  5.0  5.9  5.7  5.5  5.0 
Private services  55.6  37.7  33.8  29.7  26.3 
Public services  24.1  29.2  30.7  24.4  28.0 
Other  1.7  3.7  3.9  3.9  4.8 
Note: Source: Regional Accounts, Statistic Finland   26 
 
According to the Labour Employment Statistics of Statistics Finland, economic 
development has varied across regions since the mid-1990s when Finland started to 
recover from a severe economic recession (Figure 1). During the recession, employment 
deteriorated fast everywhere in Finland, whereas since the mid-1990s the capital region 
and other large university regions have outperformed positively the rest of the country. 
Employment in the countryside has been remarkably poor, as the 1999 levels have 
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Figure 1.  Evolution of the number of jobs across regional groups, 1987-1999. 
Source: Labour Employment Statistics, Statistics Finland. 
Returning to the sample of firms at hand, the number of observations across the regional 
groups ranges from 12,000 to 29,000 (Table 13). The size of firms increases when 
moving from the countryside to the capital region. The mean employment of firms is 14 
persons in the countryside, whereas it is 27 in the capital region. Among Labour 
subsidies the number of subsidised firms relative to the non-subsidised is the highest in 
the other provincial centres. Among KTM subsidies the proportion is the highest in the 
countryside. Firms in the capital region receive the least of both subsidies. The average 
size of labour subsidies ranges from € 3,600 to € 4,500 and that of KTM subsidies from 
€ 30 000 to € 39 000.   27 
 















Observations  18,146  12,084  20,720  17,563  28,977  97,490 
Average employment  14  17  16  17  28  19 
Labour subsidies             
N of subsidies  2,848  1,846  3,662  2,512  2,769  13,637 
Share of firms 
subsidised 
0,16  0,15  0,18  0,14  0,10  0,14 
Average subsidy, €  4,435  4,499  4,486  3,609  4,178  4,229 
Investment and Operation subsidies         
N of subsidies  1,671  769  1,370  810  903  5,523 
Share of firms 
subsidised 
0,09  0,06  0,07  0,05  0,03  0,06 
Average subsidy, €  39,862  31,948  29,634  33,973  38,346  35,112 
Note: We have dropped firms for which we do not have information on regional location. 
Regional analysis may be problematic in the data at hand because the unit of 
observation is the firm. Some firms have several branch plants, which makes the 
determination of location cumbersome. However, as our description in section 4 
showed, the mean size of firms (in terms of number of personnel) is very low. This 
implies that the number of firms with more than one establishment is fairly small as 
well. If the structure of the l arge firms located in our different geographical 
classifications ‘differ’, then the effect of Labour subsidies on the firm’s own 
employment would change and give more a accurate estimate only when the large firms 
are omitted from the regression models.  
Excluding the largest firms
22 from the data, regional differences appear to be 
surprisingly large between the elasticities of own-payroll with respect to Labour 
subsidies (Table 14). Elasticity (the sum of current and lagged coefficient) is the 
strongest in the countryside, whereas it appears to be low in the other provincial centres 
and the intermediate manufacturing regions. The elasticity about four times larger in the 
countryside compared to the latter group. 
                                                 
22 When the regressions are estimated including and excluding the largest firms that most probably have 
more than one plant, results remain surprisingly similar. This implies that despite our original hypothesis, 
the location of the largest firms is not biasing our results.   28 
 
As previously, we now calculate the marginal effect using the estimates for elasticity 
and the proportion of subsidies to own payroll (Table 14). The proportion of subsidies 
to own payroll is higher in the countryside and the capital region than elsewhere. The 
differences in this proportion between the regional groups are so large, that the regional 
differences in marginal effects are different from those in elasticities. While in marginal 
effect the countryside remains at the top, the other large university centre regions come 
second and the other provincial centres third. It appears that one extra Euro of subsidies 
increases the firm’s own payroll levels (in monetary terms) by 49 cents in the 
countryside and only 15 cents in the intermediate industrial centres. The difference 
between the two extremes is rather large, as the average marginal effect over all groups 
was found to be 34 cents (see section 5.2). 
Table 14.   Marginal effects by regional group; largest firms excluded 
Labour subsidies  Subsidy / own 
payroll 
Elasticity  Marginal effect 
Countryside  0.041  0.020***  0.49 
Intermediate industrial centres  0.038  0.006  0.15 
Other provincial centres  0.019  0.005  0.28 
Other large university centres   0.027  0.012**  0.44 
Capital region  0.053  0.014**  0.26 
Investment and Operation 
subsidies 
Subsidy / personnel  Elasticity  Marginal Effect 
Countryside  10974  -0.001  -0.00000010 
Intermediate industrial centres  10298  -0.001  -0.00000006 
Other provincial centres  10555  0.013**  0.00000120 
Other large university centres   8945  0.003  0.00000034 
Capital region  13592  -0.001  -0.00000009 
Note: Elasticities for Labour subsidies are from regressions of log-own payroll on log subsidies in the 
current and lagged form and control variables that include sales, fixed capital, wages and profitability in 
the current and lagged form and subsidies from two other sources. Elasticities for KTM subsidies are 
from regressions of log personnel on log subsidies (in the current and lagged form) and control variables. 
In both models the elasticity column reports the sum of current and lagged form coefficient. (***) denotes 
statistical significance at the 1 % level, (**) denotes statistical significance at the 5 % level and (*) 
denotes statistical significance at the 10 % level. We exclude observations whose information on their 
location is missing. 
Although the marginal effect in the countryside is as high as 0.49, it still points to 
displacement, as the firm’s share of the payroll in a subsidised job is 60 per cent. This 
means that one Euro of subsidies to be effective, it should have encouraged the firm to   29 
 
increase its own payroll by more than 1.5 Euros.
23 Nevertheless, the mildest 
displacement effect in the countryside suggests that regional policy has been more 
effective in areas where the need for development has been the greatest. Therefore, 
there may be a case for an increase in the labour subsidies from the regional policy 
perspective. 
Finally, it appears that the statistically significant effect of Investment and Operation 
subsidies in the overall evaluation is due to relatively strong effect in the o ther 
provincial centres (Table 14). Elsewhere the KTM subsidies have not had any effect on 
the employment (the number of personnel) of firms.   
7. Conclusion 
This paper evaluated the effect of business subsidies on the employment of firms during 
1995-1998. The main finding was that Labour subsidies create displacement effect and 
Investment and Operation subsidies have had a very mild positive effect on 
employment. 
One Euro increase in Investment and Operation subsidies causes the payroll in firms to 
increase on average by 5 cents. As the average wage is € 21 000, one extra job created 
with Investment and Operation subsidies costs € 440 000. In personnel equations we 
ended up with a very similar marginal effect. According to these estimates, the cost of 
one job is € 430 000. This indicates that despite of their statistical significance and 
objectives to increase employment, Investment and Operation subsidies are expensive 
from a purely employment point of view. However, these KTM subsidies are delivered 
to a great extent for investment projects. Although our results suggest that the 
subsidised investments have not resulted in any considerable number of new jobs, 
investments may nevertheless have other positive effects on firms. In such a case 
however, one cannot defend the use of investment subsidies on employment grounds , 
as the case for investment subsidies is elsewhere. 
                                                 
23 We showed earlier that if firms share is 60 %, then the public share is 40%. When the public subsidies 
is increased by one Euro, the share of the firm must increase at least by 1.5 (1/0.40=2.5 and 1.5/2.5=0.60) 
in order to have a positive effect.   30 
 
Labour subsidies increase the firms’ own employment payroll on average by 11 per 
cent. The marginal effect of subsidies however, is 34 per cent. As on average firms pay 
themselves at least 60 per cent of the employment payroll of a worker in a subsidised 
job, our result suggests that labour subsidies displace the firms’ own employment 
expenditures. This means that labour subsidies a llow firms to reallocate their 
employment expenditure to other uses. For example in our sample, firms receiving 
labour subsidies tended to invest more in their physical capital than other firms. These 
investments contribute slightly but positively to the f irms’ own employment 
expenditure. 
When considering the actual purpose of labour subsidies, the strong displacement effect 
is not that surprising. The purpose of labour subsidies is to improve human resources 
development of the work force as well as to encourage firms to increase employment. 
Labour subsidies are often directed to firms who employ workers, whose productivity is 
lower than the level needed in active labour markets. Therefore, these people are not 
easily employable with the prevailing minimum wage level of the sector in question. 
Labour subsidies are used to fill the gap between wages that firms are willing to pay to 
these people and the prevailing wage level.  
However, poor performance of labour subsidies raises the question of whether this 
public outlay could be used more efficiently otherwise. One alternative is to shift 
subsidised jobs from the private to the public sector. We have a shortage of workers, 
particularly in the large health care sector, and this could easily accommodate more 
subsidised jobs. Earlier studies have shown a weakness in this policy, however (Aho et 
al.1999, Hämäläinen, 1999). A finding usually is that working in a subsidised job, has 
improved the subsequent labour market performance of the participant, only when the 
subsidised job has been in the private sector. Subsidised jobs in the public sector have 
not created this kind of improvement. Alternatively, we could use the resources 
currently devoted to labour subsidies as a tax reduction, which w ould improve 
employment in the economy by increasing disposable income. Thirdly, labour subsidies 
could be used more effectively in other the labour market measures. For example, we 
could increase training and education or improve the efficiency of other public labour 
market services.   31 
 
This paper studied the effectiveness of labour subsidies from the firm perspective. 
Before a final policy conclusion is made, a wider perspective is needed. For example, a 
subsidy may release a firm’s own funds to a use that improves the firm’s performance. 
Investments and marketing are examples of such uses. Further, we know from earlier 
studies that labour subsidies have indeed improved the subsequent labour market 
success of the program’s participants. Therefore, we cannot tell with absolute certainty 
whether the overall social effect of labour subsidies is positive or negative. 
Regional results show that the displacement effect of labour subsidies is the smallest in 
the countryside. This suggests that regional policy has been more effective in areas 
where the need for development has been the greatest. This also implies that labour 
subsidies have contributed somewhat to the ongoing convergence of regional economies 
in Finland. The displacement however, does not increase linearly with a increasing 
urbanisation, as in the intermediate industrial centres the displacement effect is the 
strongest.  
It is somewhat surprising that the effectiveness of business subsidies does not change 
with the economic importance of regions. While the displacement effect is the mildest 
in the countryside, it is not the strongest in the capital region but in the intermediate 
industrial centres. The same applies to both Labour and Investment and Operation 
subsidies. The positive effect on employment is entirely due to the other provincial 
centres, whereas the effect is statistically insignificant elsewhere. The regional 
effectiveness depends on factors, investigation of which is left to a future work. 
Acknowledgements 
Financial support given by Parlamentary State Auditors is gratefully acknowledged. We 
would like to thank the following persons for valuable discussions and comments: Kari 
Hämäläinen, Pekka Ilmakunnas, Jaakko Kiander, Pertti Kohi, Mauri Lehmusto, Miguel 
Leon-Ledesma, Sari Pekkala, Heikki Räisänen and Tony Thirwall. 
   32 
 
References 
Aho, S., J. Halme and J. Nätti (1999). Tukityöllistämisen ja työvoimakoulutuksen 
kohdentuminen ja vaikuttavuus 1990-1996 [in Finnish]. Työpoliittinen tutkimus 207. 
Ministry of Labour, Helsinki. 
Akerlof, F. A. Rose, J. Yellen and H. Hessenius (1991). East Germany in from the cold: 
the Economic Aftermath of Currency Union. Brookings Papers for Economic 
Activity 1, 1 – 87. 
Begg, D. and R. Portes (1993). Eastern Germany Since Unification: Wage Subsidies 
Remain a Better Way. The Economics of Transition 1, 383 – 400. 
Blundel, R. and M. Costa Dias (2000). Evaluation Methods for Non-Experimental Data. 
Fiscal Studies, 41, 4, 427-468. 
Branstetter, L. and M. Sakakibara (1998). Japanese Research Consortia: A 
microeconometric Analysis of Industrial Policy. Journal of Industrial Economics, 46, 
207 – 233. 
Dunne, P. and A. Hughes (1994). Age, Size, Growth and Survival: UK Companies in 
the 1980s. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42, 2, 115-140. 
Dunne, T., M.J. Roberts, and L. Samuelson. (1988). Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in 
US Manufacturing Industries. Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 4, 495-515. 
Economic Council (2001). Regional Economic Development and Regional Policy in 
Finland. Prime Minister’s Office, Publications, 1/2001. 
Evans, D.S. (1987). The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size and Age: Estimates 
for 100 Manufacturing Industries. Journal of Industrial Economics, 34, 4, 567- 581. 
European Commission – EC (2000). Eight survey on state aid in the European Union. 
COM (2000) final, 11.4.2000: Brussels. 
Fuest, C. and B. Huber (2000). Why do Governments Subsidise Investment and not 
Employment? Journal of Public Economics, 78, 171-192. 
Hamermesh, D. (1993). Labor Demand. Princeton University Press. New Jersey. 
Heckman, J., LaLonde and Smith (1999). The Economics and Econometrics of Active 
Labour Market Programs. In Ashenfelter and Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor 
Economics, vol. 3.Elsevier Science. 
Hämäläinen, K. (1999). Aktiivinen työvoimapolitiikka ja työttömien työllistyminen 
avoimille työmarkkinoille [in Finnish]. The Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy. B 151. Helsinki. 
Irwin, D. and P. Klennow (1996). High-tech R&D Subsidies: Estimating the Effects of 
Sematech. Journal of International Economics, 40, 323-344. 
Kangasharju, A. & T. Venetoklis. Business Subsidies and Employment of Firms. To be 
presented at the Congress of European Association of Labour Economists, Paris, 
2003.   33 
 
Klette, T. and J. Moen (1998). R&D Investment Responses to R&D Subsidies: A 
Theoretical Analysis and a Microeconometric Study. Mimeo, Presented at NBER 
Summer Institute 1998. 
Klette, Tor J., Jarle Moen and Zve Griliches (1999). Do Subsidies to Commercial R&D 
Reduce Market Failures? Microeconomic Evaluation Studies. NBER Working Paper 
6947. 
Lach, S. (2000). Do R&D Subsidies Stimulate or Displace Private R&D? Evidence 
from Israel. NBER working Paper 7943. 
Lipsky (1980).Street – level bureaucracy. Dilemmas of the individual in public services. 
New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Payne, A. (1998). Does the Government Crowd-out private Donations? New Evidence 
from a Sample of non-Profit Firms. Journal of Public Economics, 69, 323-345. 
Roper, S. and N. Hewitt-Dundas (2001). Grant Assistance and Small Firm Development 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Sottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 48, 1, 99-117. 
Venetoklis, T (1999). Process evaluation of business subsidies in Finland. A 
quantitative approach. VATT Research Reports No 58: Helsinki. 
Venetoklis, T. (2001). Business subsidies and bureaucratic behaviour. A revised 




Table A1. Description of variables 
Variable  Mean; standard deviation  Min ; Max 
Endogenous     
Ln (the number of personnel)  1.732 ; 1.240  0 ; 9.53 
Ln(the amount of payroll, FIM)  13.451 ; 1.335  11.16 ; 22.03 
Ln(the amount of own payroll, FIM)  13.360 ; 1.343  7.98 ; 21.83 
Exogenous     
Variable of interest     
Dummy for TM subsidies  0.138 ; 0.345  0 ; 1 
Dummy for KTM subsidies  0.056 ; 0.229  0 ; 1 
Dummy for TEKES subsidies  0.013 ; 0.119  0 ; 1 
Ln(the amount of TM subsidies)  1.334 ; 3.350  0 ; 13.81 
Ln(the amount of KTM subsidies)  0.623 ; 2.588  0 ; 16.01 
Ln(the amount of TEKES subsidies)  0.157 ; 1.396  0 ; 16.80 
Controls     
Gross profits, FIM million  5.566 ; 75. 970  -272.1 ; 9692 
Ln(the amount of sales, FIM)  14.806 ; 1.530  0 ; 24.02 
Ln(the amount of fixed capital, FIM)  12.238 ; 2.026  0 ; 23.94 
Ln(payroll per personnel, FIM)  11.719 ; 0.436  11.16 ; 16.12 
Note: Ln is natural logarithm. One € is 5,94573 FIM. Table 2A. Correlation table. 
                                1.       2.       3.       4.       5.       6.       7. 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
1.       ln(TM subsidy), t|   1.0000 
2.     ln(TM subsidy), t-1|   0.4312   1.0000 
3.      ln(KTM subsidy), t|   0.1520   0.1819   1.0000 
4.    ln(KTM subsidy), t-1|   0.1400   0.1736   0.5689   1.0000 
5.   ln(TEKES subsidy), t |   0.0583   0.0860   0.2284   0.2090   1.0000 
6.  ln(TEKES subsidy), t-1|   0.0453   0.0707   0.1907   0.1967   0.6371   1.0000 
7.        gross profit, t |   0.0445   0.0674   0.0819   0.0589   0.1678   0.1107   1.0000 
8.       gross profit, t-1|   0.0474   0.0589   0.0815   0.0451   0.1640   0.1384   0.8163 
9.               Year 1997|  -0.0550  -0.1372  -0.1018  -0.0886  -0.0657  -0.0588  -0.0188 
10.              Year 1998|  -0.0465  -0.0705  -0.0585  -0.0562  -0.0290  -0.0279  -0.0207 
11.           Ln(sales), t|   0.1947   0.2095   0.2071   0.2008   0.1527   0.1456   0.2348 
12.         Ln(sales), t-1|   0.1844   0.2073   0.2059   0.1990   0.1509   0.1459   0.2298 
13.   Ln(fixed capital), t|   0.1701   0.1945   0.2389   0.2269   0.1408   0.1367   0.1940 
14. Ln(fixed capital), t-1|   0.1594   0.1898   0.2343   0.2270   0.1401   0.1388   0.1955 
15.        Average wage, t|  -0.0323   0.0009   0.0539   0.0553   0.0900   0.0851   0.0926 
16.      Average wage, t-1|  -0.0189  -0.0323   0.0444   0.0482   0.0805   0.0805   0.0957 
 
 
                                7.        8.       9.       10.      11.      12.      13.    14.      15. 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
7.       gross profit, t-1|   1.0000 
8.               Year 1997|  -0.0197   1.0000 
9.               Year 1998|  -0.0188  -0.2416   1.0000 
10.          Ln(sales), t |   0.2137  -0.0400  -0.1078   1.0000 
11.         Ln(sales), t-1|   0.2126  -0.0458  -0.1083   0.9430   1.0000 
12.   Ln(fixed capital), t|   0.1780  -0.0587  -0.0801   0.6358   0.6318   1.0000 
13. Ln(fixed capital), t-1|   0.1804  -0.0578  -0.0849   0.6263   0.6328   0.9459   1.0000 
14.        Average wage, t|   0.0808  -0.0462  -0.1115   0.2200   0.2048   0.1424   0.1397  1.0000 
15.      Average wage, t-1|   0.0859   0.0384  -0.0936   0.2342   0.2501   0.1614   0.1631  0.6377   1.0000 
 
 
 Table A3. Regional sub-regions by regional group 
 
Capital Region  Other Large University 
Centres 
Other Provincial Centres  Intermediate Industrial Centres 
 011 Helsinki      131      Jyväskylä      201      Porvoo      103      Savonlinna 
     023      Turku      081      Kouvola      052      Riihimäki 
     064      Tampere      071      Lahti      082      Kotka-Hamina 
     171      Oulu      043      Pori      013      Tammisaari 
        211      Mariehamn      154      Jakobstadsregionen 
        101      Mikkeli      022      Salo 
        182      Kajaani      093      Imatra 
        122      Joensuu      135      Äänekoski 
        051      Hämeenlinna      134      Jämsä 
        191      Rovaniemi      063      Etelä-Pirkanmaa 
        162      Kokkola      041      Rauma 
        142      Pohjoiset seinänaapurit      012      Lohja 
        152      Vaasa      114      Varkaus 
        091      Lappeenranta      174      Raahe 
        112      Kuopio      192      Kemi-Tornio 
 
Countryside   
    094      Kärkikunnat      068      Lounais-Pirkanmaa 
    146      Järviseutu      053      Forssa 
    153      Sydösterbottens kustregion      024      Vakka-Suomi 
    124      Keski-Karjala      066      Koillis-Pirkanmaa 
    111      Ylä-Savo      177      Ylivieska 
    115      Sisä-Savo      197      Pohjois-Lappi 
    176      Nivala-Haapajärvi      196      Tunturi-Lappi 
    141      Suupohja      194      Koillis-Lappi 
    144      Kuusiokunnat      181      Kehys-Kainuu 
    172      Lakeus      178      Koillismaa 
    044      Pohjois-Satakunta      193      Torniolaakso 
    143      Eteläiset seinänaapurit      123      Ilomantsi 
    025      Loimaa      175      Siikalatva 
    121      Outokumpu      173      Ii 
    062      Kaakkois-Pirkanmaa      212      Föglö 
    067      Pohjois-Pirkanmaa      125      Pielisen Karjala 
    065      Itä-Pirkanmaa      137      Viitasaari 
    021      Åboland-Turunmaa      161      Kaustinen 
    042      Kaakkois-Satakunta      102      Juva 
    145      Härmänmaa      136      Saarijärvi 
    202      Loviisa      113      Koillis-Savo 
    105      Pieksämäki      104      Joroinen 
    151      Kyrönmaa      132      Kaakkoinen Keski-Suomi 
    061      Luoteis-Pirkanmaa      133      Keuruu 
    072      Itä-Häme      092      Länsi-Saimaa 
       
 
 
 